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ABSTRACT 
By the late 1980s, Colombia had become the world’s leading producer and exporter of 
cocaine, as well as the most important coca growing country in the Andes. In the context 
of the War on Drugs, U.S. aid to the country increased significantly during this period, 
and by 1991, Colombia was the leading recipient of U.S. aid in Latin America. Despite 
the increase in U.S. resources, Colombia’s military suffered a series of important defeats 
to prominent guerilla groups, which were regarded as major players in the cocaine trade, 
as well as a serious threat to political stability in the country. In response, a U.S. and 
Colombian partnership known as Plan Colombia (2000–2005) was initiated, and in 
accordance with the plan, more coca was eradicated in Colombia than anywhere else in 
the world. In this context, this thesis asks, what are the unintended consequences of coca 
eradication as they pertain to Plan Colombia? To answer this question, this thesis 
elucidates the fundamental linkages between “mainstream” and “deviant” globalization 
and the unintended consequences of supply-side drug control efforts, such as an 
eradication policy. It also illuminates how the most important global economic 
transformations of the past 40 years have profoundly and continuously undermined U.S. 
efforts to eradicate coca, and how strategies that continue to discount the role of 
globalization (deviant or otherwise) will likely play out in the future. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
By the late 1980s, Colombia had assumed the mantle of the world’s leading 
producer and exporter of cocaine. At the same time, it had also become the most 
important coca growing country in the Andes. In the context of the War on Drugs, U.S. 
aid to the country increased significantly during this period, and by 1991, Colombia was 
the leading recipient of U.S. aid in Latin America.1 Despite the increase in U.S. 
resources, Colombia’s military suffered a series of important defeats to the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas—
FARC), which was regarded as a major player in the cocaine trade, as well as a serious 
threat to political stability in the country. Consequently, Colombian President Andrés 
Pastrana Arango (1998–2002) pledged to control the drug trade and end the conflict with 
the FARC, and therefore, Plan Colombia was born. The U.S. and Colombian partnership 
known as Plan Colombia was designed as a six-year initiative with three main objectives: 
(1) reduce the flow of illicit narcotics and improve security; (2) promote social and 
economic justice; and (3) promote the rule of law.2 The idea for Plan Colombia 
originated in Colombia, and was initially viewed as a welcome step by U.S. policy 
makers who indicated that Colombia was taking ownership of its development and 
security challenges. As originally proposed by President Pastrana, it covered five 
principle areas: the peace process; economic growth; anti-drug production and 
trafficking; the reform of the justice system, and the protection of human rights; as well 
as democracy-promotion and social development.  
                                                 
1 María Clemencia Ramírez Lemus, Kimberly Stanton, and John Walsh, “Colombia: A Vicious Circle 
of Drugs and War,” in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of US Policy, ed. Coletta A. 
Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 105.  
2 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to the Honorable, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, PLAN COLOMBIA, Drug Reduction Goals, Were Not Fully 
Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance (GAO-
09-71), Washington, DC: GPO, October 2008, 11. 
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After Pastrana’s first visit to Washington, however, his viewpoint changed 
significantly. Washington’s response was that Plan Colombia was but a “catalog of good 
intentions” that needed considerable editing.3 Accordingly, with U.S. aid tied to the 
revisions it wanted to impose, Pastrana reconsidered his approach and decided that a 
U.S.-backed militarized strategy was required to resolve Colombia’s security and 
development issues. Following that decision, most of the aid for Colombia was redirected 
towards interdiction and eradication efforts at the expense of other stated goals, including 
much needed development. This redirection in strategy ensured that more coca 
eradication would be conducted in Colombia than anywhere else in the world. The 
strategy however, was executed in an environment of weak institutional development and 
limited state presence outside of urban centers, thereby widening the “legitimacy” gap 
between the state and the populace. All the while, globalization was connecting the 
world’s economies (both licit and illicit), and contributing to the complexity of global 
networks. 
The concept of unintended consequences is useful for examining coca eradication 
policies because it illuminates the perverse unanticipated effects of legislation relating to 
coca eradication and the War on Drugs. As the 19th century French economic journalist 
Frédéric Bastiat observed, the “seen” were the obvious visible consequences of an action 
or policy, but the “unseen” were less obvious, and often unintended, consequences. In his 
famous essay entitled “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen,” Bastiat wrote: 
In the economic sphere, an act, a habit, institution, a law produces not only 
one effect, but a series of effects. Of these effects, the first alone is 
immediate, it appears simultaneously with the cause; it is seen. The other 
effects emerge subsequently; they are not seen; we are fortunate if we 
foresee them. There is only one difference between a bad economist and a 
good one: the bad economist confines himself to the visible effect; the 
good economist takes into account both the effect that can be seen and 
those effects that must be foreseen. Yet this difference is tremendous; for 
it almost always happens that when the immediate consequence is 
favorable, the later consequences are disastrous, and vice versa. Whence it  
 
                                                 
3 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to the Honorable, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, PLAN COLOMBIA, Drug Reduction Goals, Were Not Fully 
Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance, 11. 
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follows that the bad economist pursues a small present good that will be 
followed by a great evil to come, while the good economist pursues a great 
good to come, at the risk of a small present evil.4 
Bastiat’s discussion on the “seen” and the “unseen” is particularly useful for this 
thesis considering the connection he draws between societal costs and bad public policy 
not rooted in sound economics. As is discussed, coca eradication specifically, and the 
War on Drugs more generally, is one such example in which the policy of choice 
misjudged in a large way the socioeconomic realities of Colombia, and underestimated 
the countervailing effects of the changing world economy. Robert Jervis noted that the 
most obvious reason for unintended consequences is competition.  “As actors seek 
advantage and try to outstrategize one another, come of them –if not all-must be 
surprised.5 Competition between state and non-state actors in the context of a rapidly 
globalizing world is the focus of this thesis: What are the unintended consequences of the 
coca eradication as they pertain to Plan Colombia? 
To answer this question, this thesis elucidates the fundamental linkages between 
mainstream and deviant globalization (these terms are clarified in more detail below), the 
unintended consequences of coca eradication, and the artificially elevated risk premium 
that result from supply-side drug control policies, such as coca eradication. It also 
illuminates how the most important global economic transformations of the past 40 years 
have profoundly and continuously undermined U.S. efforts to eradicate coca, and how 
strategies that continue to discount globalization (deviant or otherwise) and its 
contribution to a more interactively complex world, will likely play out in the future. 
Specifically, globalization and the infrastructure that supports it have helped shift existing 
political structures, especially in the developing world, and today’s deviant entrepreneurs 
have accrued the power and influence equivalent to, or in excess of the state. Pablo 
                                                 
4 For more information relating to the history, use, and formalization of the term “unintended 
consequences,” refer to Rob Norton, “Unintended Consequences, in the Concise Encyclopedia of 
Economics,” 2008, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html; Frédéric Bastiat’s 
essay, “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen,” 2000, http://www.econlib.org/library/Bastiat/basEss1.html; 
Robert K. Merton, Sociological Ambivalence and Other Essays (New York: Free Press, 1976). 
5 Jervis, Robert. Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton, N.J.: (Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 61. 
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Escobar, for example, worked his way to the top of Colombia’s Medellin Cartel, and 
became one of the world’s wealthiest men by engaging in illicit activities. Escobar was 
inaugurated on Forbes Billionaires issue in 1987, where he remained for seven 
consecutive years until his death, appearing for the final time in the July 1993 
Billionaires issue.6 His cocaine business enabled him to use some of his ill-gotten funds 
to “develop” Medellin. He built houses for the poor, soccer fields, and a zoo for the 
public. He would also go on to buy a Medellin newspaper, become influential in politics, 
and even run for public office. This example demonstrates how profits from illicit 
businesses are used to garner popular support, and how deviant entrepreneurs can 
establish themselves atop of a complex globally integrated system through which they 
develop enough capacity to compete directly with the state for power and influence.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
For more than four decades, the United States (U.S.) has been involved in the War 
on Drugs, and throughout much of this period, the eradication of coca crops across the 
Andes has been a major component of Washington’s drug control policy. The principle 
targets of U.S. eradication campaigns since the beginning of the War on Drugs in the 
early 1970s have been Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. Eradication policy is driven by the 
premise that eliminating coca plants will lead to a decrease in the production of cocaine, 
and gradually over time, supply will diminish in the United States. As cocaine becomes 
scarce, prices are expected to increase, and thereby, further discouraging its use. 
However, illicit drug markets have proven impossible to control, particularly from the 
supply-side. Despite temporarily successful eradication programs in Peru and Bolivia in 
the late-1990s, coca cultivation moved north to Colombia, which ensured that it remained 
the most important cocaine producing country in the world.7 This example illustrates a 
recurring phenomenon known as the “balloon effect,” a term that is used widely in the 
                                                 
6 Pablo Escobar is not unique as a billionaire drug lord. In her article, Erin Carlyle, “Billionaire 
Druglords: El Chapo Guzman, Pablo Escobar, The Ochoa Brothers,” Forbes, March 12, 2012, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erincarlyle/2012/03/13/billionaire-druglords-el-chapo-guzman-pablo-escobar-
the-ochoa-brothers/, she discusses the top money earners of the illicit narcotics industry.  
7 Jeremy Bigwood and Phillip Coffin, “Coca Eradication,” FPIP, October 2005, 
http://www.fpif.org/reports/coca_eradication. 
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literature to describe how the various elements of the narcotics industry shift production 
and trafficking patterns in response to pressure from government counternarcotic 
initiatives, analogous to the movement of air inside of a squeezed balloon. However, this 
analogy does not even begin to capture the full extent of the negative socioeconomic and 
environmental consequences each time the illicit industry uproots to a new location.  
The research found numerous examples of unintended consequences that resulted 
from coca eradication. One obvious example is the ongoing internal migration and/or 
internal displacement throughout the Colombian countryside in response to coca 
eradication. Every time the government manually or aerially destroys a coca crop in one 
area, coca growers move elsewhere to both escape from the harmful effects of fumigation 
and to resume growing coca. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis examines the unintended consequences of coca eradication from a 
different, yet significant angle related to an often neglected element in global power 
dynamics (mainstream and deviant globalization). It needs to be elucidated that 
transnational organized crime networks, such as those involved in the illegal drug trade, 
are amongst the main beneficiaries of the wave of globalization today and have been 
since the 1970s. As a result, they have acquired a tremendous amount of power in the 
developing world. This process has only increased with the end of the Cold War.  
A growing enthusiasm for neo-liberal economic reform had already emerged by 
the early 1980s, and was given a dramatic boost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 
the 1990s, neo-liberalism was clearly in the ascendant as the leading paradigm for 
development strategists looking to deliver globalization to those parts of the world that 
had not yet been able to benefit from its virtues. Francis Fukuyama’s influential work, 
The End of History, which appeared as an article in 1989 and a book in 1992 served for 
many observers to help define a process of global transformation. Fukuyama (who did 
not actually use the term “globalization”) argued that the end of the Cold War was part of 
an evolutionary political process that had convincingly demonstrated that liberal 
democracy (grounded in liberal capitalism) had become the dominant form of human 
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government in the post-Cold War era with no serious and/or systemic competitors: “from 
monarchies and aristocracies, to religious theocracies, to the fascist and communist 
dictatorships” of the 20th century, “the only form of government that has survived intact” 
with the passing of state-socialism and communist dictatorships “has been liberal 
democracy.”8 Amongst the things Fukuyama did not foresee, however, were the 
countervailing effects of the rapid and highly uneven spread of globalization, the 
implications of which (as is illuminated later) are central to putting coca eradication in 
context and gaining a fuller appreciation of its unintended consequences. As noted by 
Thomas Friedman in the World is Flat, the world has arrived at the next phase of 
“globalization” (Globalization 3.0) in which the convergence of factors, such as post-
Cold War economic liberalization, technological advances, and integrated global supply 
chains, have gone from empowering governments, then companies, and ultimately, 
individuals.9 
Advancing neo-liberal reform and the spread of globalization, for example, had 
profound implications for the already weak “state capacity” in the nation-states of the 
former Soviet Bloc and throughout the Third World (what has also increasingly become 
known as the Global South), which had major implications for what was the Colombian 
vision of, and what would ultimately become the U.S. vision and prosecution of Plan 
Colombia. Of particular significance in this thesis is the way in which neo-liberal 
economic reforms facilitated the “hollowing out” of a growing number of states around 
the world, as funding for state budgets was drastically scaled back, public sector 
companies and services were privatized, while reform in the areas of labor, taxation and 
foreign investment were pursued with enthusiasm in an attempt to compete in an 
increasingly liberal world economy.10 As a result, a lack of governance and state 
capacity, which in many cases was already problematic, became worse. The power 
vacuum was quickly filled by illicit actors, such as warlords and transnational organized 
                                                 
8 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 45. 
9 Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 10–12. 
10 Comments from Nils Gilman from a talk he gave. Nils Gilman, “Deviant Globalization,” The Long 
Now Foundation, FORAtv, (n.d.), http://fora.tv/2010/05/10/Nils_Gilman_Deviant_Globalization. 
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crime, many of which now operate on a scope and scale that far exceeds the capacity of 
states in many parts of the developing world and puts them in a position comparable to 
large, legitimate transnational corporations in terms of influence.  
While the “hollowing out of the state” and the growing power of both legal and 
illegal businesses are central to shedding new light on the unintended consequences of 
coca eradication, it remains useful for the purposes of this thesis to also review Plan 
Colombia from multiple scales and/or levels analysis. First is the standard empirical 
evaluation of key metrics to determine the results of the policy of eradication; second is 
the “U.S. perspective,” and finally, the “Colombian perspective.” It is important to 
examine these varying viewpoints because even though the same two governments might 
execute the same policy and achieve the same results, the policy can be considered a 
success or failure depending on the government concerned. For example, eradication 
efforts in Colombia might be considered a success as measured in total hectares 
eradicated, a reduction in total cocaine produced, and/or reduced coca cultivation. 
However, the U.S. perspective might consider success in terms of slowing down illicit 
cocaine flows across its border. This thesis focuses the analysis on the ripple effects of 
coca eradication policy at the Colombian and the U.S. scale. It is probable, however, that 
other scales can be found. Regionally, for example, eradication has contributed to shifting 
coca-growing patterns between Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, and fluid trafficking 
networks linked to Mexico, and more recently, Brazil. Each government is myopic, and 
therefore, is going to draw different conclusions about the success or failure of anti-
narcotics strategies. This thesis is arguing that these perspectives are insufficient to 
understand fully the array of unintended consequences of coca eradication and introduces 
the lens of globalization to help better understand them. 
A substantial amount of resources was committed to Plan Colombia, and a 
considerable portion was allocated for coca eradication. Therefore, an expected outcome 
should have been a significant reduction in the supply of coca cultivation and cocaine 
production in Colombia, along with a decrease of cocaine use in the United States. The 
objective of Plan Colombia specific to coca eradication was to reduce production by 50 
percent over a period of six years. According to the United Nation Office on Drug 
 8
Control (UNODC), however, the reductions over the six-year period were marginal 
despite an extensive aerial eradication campaign. Additionally, the global supply of 
cocaine during the same time period increased and the price remained relatively stable.11  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature regarding the War and Drugs, Plan Colombia and coca eradication 
is vast. It can be roughly divided into three general points of view: first, the effects of 
eradication have met or contributed to most of the stated objectives; second, the effects of 
eradication have failed to meet or contribute to most of the state objectives; and third, the 
results are mixed.  
The most favorable narratives regarding Plan Colombia came from official 
channels, principally the agencies charged with administering Plan Colombia such as the 
Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DOS), and Presidential 
administrations. According to the State Department for example, the success of Plan 
Colombia is real and measurable and has helped Colombia fight narcotics trafficking, 
terrorism, and transnational crime; promote economic and social development; assist 
conflict victims; strengthen democratic institutions, including human rights mechanisms 
and the justice system; and begin a process to demobilize and reintegrate illegal armed 
groups.12 The Colombian official position on Plan Colombia is equally optimistic. Since 
2002, Colombia has experienced an unprecedented period of economic expansion, social 
development, and increased security. Through a series of bold reforms, the government 
has fostered growth of the Colombian economy, increased government transparency, 
investment in social welfare programs and experienced a significant reduction of the level 
of violence in the country. The administration of Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002–2010) 
attributed Plan Colombia to a policy based on a platform of Restoring Confidence. He 
reported that since 2000, U.S. assistance has enabled the Colombians to achieve 
                                                 
11 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, “UNODC Fact Sheet—Colombia Coca Survey For 
2004,” in Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region, A Survey of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, June 2005, 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/andean/Part1_excutive_summary.pdf. 
12 Excerpt from Department of State briefing. R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 
“Future Engagement and Partnership With Latin America,” as Prepared for Delivery at the Council of the 
America (Washington, DC, November 20, 2006). 
 9
significant security advances in two key areas. The first is an enhanced police and 
military presence throughout the country that has displaced illegal armed groups, and 
second, they have degraded the finances of illegal armed groups and weakened their 
operational capabilities through advanced counter-narcotics strategy, and military and 
police actions.13  
The preponderance of the independent literature relating to Plan Colombia and the 
policy of eradication is negative.  Coletta Youngers offers one of the seminal works on 
the topic in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America.14 The work reviews the regional 
implication of U.S. drug policy, and specifically addresses the rise of Plan Colombia, the 
shift in focus from development, and the adverse effects of eradication. For example, 
Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh describe the partial shift away from interdiction and the 
renewed emphasis with which the United States and Colombia pursued crop eradication. 
The reasoning observed was that interdiction was expensive and complicated, and 
required the deployment of forces, overseas bases, operations in international waters, 
close cooperation with host nation security forces, and a litany of other complexities. On 
the other hand, eradication was perceived as simple because crops are out in the open and 
“they don’t move,” and under President Clinton’s directive, eradication became the 
preferred approach to drug control in the 1990s.15  Paul Gootenberg has written one of 
the most comprehensive works covering the history of the cocaine industry from 1850 to 
the present.16 His biggest contribution is his methodical tracing of the events and policies 
that helped give rise to cocaine as a global drug. Grace Livingstone offers another 
historical perspective. Her work centers on the relationship between the rise of the drug 
industry in Colombia on the one hand and the country’s longstanding social inequalities 
                                                 
13 Embassy of Colombia, “Colombia: A Success Story, Restoring Confidence,” (n.d.), 
http://www.colombiaemb.org/spanish/colombia-a-success-story-mainmenu-94/restoring-confidence-
mainmenu-230. 
14 Youngers, Coletta A., and Eileen Rosin. “The US War on Drugs: Its Impact in Latin America and 
the Caribbean.” In Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of US Policy, edited by Coletta A. 
Youngers and Eileen Rosin. 3. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. 
15 Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh, “Colombia: A Vicious Circle of Drugs and War,” 117.  
16 Paul Gootenberg, Andean Cocaine: the Making of a Global Drug (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2008). 
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and political exclusion on the other hand.17 Michael Kenney, meanwhile, provides great 
insight into the organization and structure of the cartel’s, and how they leverage the 
network structure to adapt and innovate ahead of law enforcement institutions.18 
Additional relevant and timely online sources include Adam Isacson’s Drug Policy desk 
at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)19 and Sanho Tree of the Institute 
for Policy Studies (IPS)20.  Together, they represent the front that studies alternative 
policy options and political movements within the United States, the United Nations 
(UN) and elsewhere, which may have a broader impact on the emerging drug legislation 
and drug policies overall. 
Most of the mixed results are found in the literature produced by think tanks and 
in bi-partisan surveys and reports submitted to the U.S. Congress for review. For 
example, a RAND Corporation study projected that the savings of treatment programs are 
larger than the control costs.  They estimated that the costs of crime and lost productivity 
are reduced by $7.46 for every dollar spent on treatment.21  The Government Accounting 
Office is another example of mixed reporting. For example, their reports typically have a 
positive outlook on the professional character of military and police training, but temper 
the achievement with a warning about human rights violations. 
Given the perspective on transnational organized crime and its relationship to the 
failure of coca eradication as presented in this thesis, it is also important to discuss the 
relevant literature on globalization. The main concern is to discuss some key examples of 
                                                 
17 Grace Livingstone, Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2004). 
18 Michael Kenney, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government 
Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University State Press, 
2007). 
19 Adam Isacson is a key member of WOLS’s Regional Security Policy team and his areas of expertise 
include:  Regional and Military Security Policy, Arms Transfers, and U.S. Assistance.  For more 
information on his work and WOLA, visit: http://www.wola.org/people/adam_isacson   
20 Sanho Tree is a fellow and director of the Drug Policy Project at the institute of Policy Studies.  The 
focus of his work is to end the domestic and international “War on Drugs” and replace it with policies that 
promote public health and safety, as well as economic alternatives to the prohibition drug economy.  For 
more information on his work, visit: http://www.ips-dc.org/staff/sanho 
21 Rydell, C.P. & Everingham, S.S., Controlling Cocaine, Prepared for the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy and the United States Army (Santa Monica, CA: Drug Policy Research Center, RAND 
Corporation, 1994), p. xvi. 
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the globalization literature that reflect the extremes ends of the spectrum of the ongoing 
debate about the positive and negative consequences of globalization. The work of 
Thomas Friedman and Nils Gilman helps to establish the extreme position at either end of 
the debate. Friedman provides the context for the upside of globalization, whereas 
Gilman is a bit more representative of the “ugly underbelly” of globalization, or as he 
terms it, “deviant globalization.” Friedman’s best-selling book, The World Is Flat, was a 
celebration of globalization and the benefits that flowed from U.S. political and economic 
leadership in the post-Cold War world. The essence of his globalization argument is that 
the world is becoming a level playing field and more and more people have an 
opportunity to participate in the global economy, where “flatteners,” such as technology, 
connectivity and collaboration, have leveled the global playing field, unlike any other 
time in history.22  However, globalization is not making the world flatter or more equal 
for everyone. Gilman continues the story of globalization where Friedman left off by 
exposing the shadowy reality of globalization as experienced in much of the developing 
world. He describes deviant globalization as a different category of economic actions that 
violate noneconomic, “Western” norms expressed in terms of human rights, modalities of 
violence and health, and even notions of the sacred.23  For illicit actors who perpetuate 
deviant globalization, there is nothing deviant about it. In today’s era of globalization in 
which large portions of the developing world are excluded (in part because of ineffective 
state institutions made worse the process already characterized as the “hollowing out of 
the state”), deviant entrepreneurs from the global south served as the arbiters for 
prosperity and development with resources several orders of magnitude greater than the 
aid provided by the state. In fact, the unconstrained illicit forms of liberal capitalism are 
far more central to globalization (if not at the center of globalization) than most observers 
realize, or terms, such as “deviant globalization,” might suggest.  For the purposes of this 
thesis, Friedman helps establish the technological and institutional advances that have 
helped to connect the world. Gilman provides the background for understanding how 
                                                 
22 Friedman, Thomas L. The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century. New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.  
23 Gilman, Nils, Jesse Goldhammer, and Steven Weber, ed. Deviant Globalization: Black Market 
Economy in the 21st Century. London: Continuum, 2011, 9. 
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deviant entrepreneurs exploit these connections towards their ends. In Colombia, newly 
connected and highly fluid networks of deviant entrepreneurs empowered by the 
networks of a globalized world were able to adapt to, and in a large measure, defeat the 
more structured counter-narcotic programs sponsored by the state. During this contest 
between deviant entrepreneurs and the state however, amongst the biggest losers have 
been the rural populations of Colombia, who at the conclusion of Plan Colombia, have 
suffered a number of severe and long-lasting unintended consequences.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis provides a broad qualitative analysis of the War on Drugs, Plan 
Colombia, and a focus on coca eradication, one of the prominent strategies within it. In 
particular, it examines how mainstream and deviant globalization contributed to the 
failure of the coca eradication policy and the unintended consequences thereof. 
Several issues arise out of any critical discussion of coca eradication. To begin 
with, sufficient evidence suggests supply-side controls, such as eradication, are 
ineffective at reducing cocaine supply. For example, U.S. initiated efforts in the 1960s 
and 1970s to reduce marijuana trafficking from Mexico resulted in an increase in 
domestic production, and the growth of a marijuana industry in Colombia.24 The question 
arises as to why eradication was pursued as a policy if outcomes could have been known? 
A second issue that emerges from an examination of the data on eradication is the 
adverse regional implications that have been created or reinforced because of Plan 
Colombia. Even with declines in coca growing as a result of eradication in 2002 and 2003 
for example, the short-term success was not translated to strategic success; namely, deep 
and sustainable reductions in the cultivation of coca overall and the availability of 
cocaine on U.S. streets.25 Reductions in Colombia’s estimated cocaine production have 
been largely offset by a return of cocaine production to Peru and Bolivia, the original 
                                                 
24 Steven Hyland, Jr., “The Shifting Terrain of Latin American Drugs Trafficking, Origins,” Ohio 
State University, OSU Department of History 4, no. 12 (2012). 
25 Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh, “Colombia: A Vicious Circle of Drugs and War,” 113. 
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production and coca growing hubs prior to Colombia’s ascendancy as the major 
production center for cocaine as opposed to coca growing.26 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND FINDINGS 
After 40 years of prosecuting the War on Drugs, the quality and quantity of 
cocaine that reach the U.S. market has continued to increase. In part, this increase can be 
attributed to the unrelenting emphasis by every U.S. administration since Richard M. 
Nixon (1968–1974) on interdiction and eradication. However, as this thesis argues, the 
story is far more complicated. Regardless of whether interdiction and eradication are 
viewed as working, not working, or the best of available policy options, it is emphasized 
that eradication had, and is continuing to have, a range of major unintended consequences 
that flow from, and are linked to, the uneven spread of globalization. Ultimately, 
globalization helps better understand the failure to win the War on Drugs, while also 
providing greater insight into the unintended consequences of Plan Colombia in general 
and coca eradication in particular.  
While Chapter I has sought to introduce the topic and outline the argument, 
Chapter II contextualizes coca eradication as a phenomenon highly dependent on the 
dynamics of deviant and mainstream globalization. Chapter III turns to the equally 
important need to lay out the counter-narcotic patterns that began with the War on Drugs 
in the Andes, and then provides a more detailed analysis of Plan Colombia and coca 
eradication from the different levels of analysis. The fourth chapter examines in detail the 
unintended consequences of coca eradication, which is followed by a short conclusion. 
Overall, it is assumed that a better understanding of the unintended consequences of coca 
eradication requires a detailed grasp of mainstream and deviant globalization. It is to a 
more detailed discussion of globalization in both its mainstream and deviant forms that 
Chapter II addresses. 
                                                 
26 Gabriel Marcella, “Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives,” Dante B. Fascell 
North-South Center, University of Miami and the U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 
(2001): 32. 
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II. THE NORMALCY OF “DEVIANT GLOBALIZATION AND 
THE DEVIANCE OF MAINSTREAM GLOBALIZATION 
If you like entrepreneurship, if you like innovation, then you have to like 
deviant globalization! Deviant Globalization is development, representing 
an extremely significant flow of money and resources from the global 
north to the global south…almost certainly several orders of magnitude 




A central argument of this thesis is that the dynamic unfolding of mainstream and 
deviant globalization is crucial to understanding the U.S.-led War on Drugs, and Plan 
Colombia, generally, and the unintended consequences of coca eradication more 
specifically. The origins of globalization (mainstream and deviant) as the term is being 
applied in this thesis can be traced to the 1970s. In the early 1980s, the growing 
consolidation of globalization corresponded with a revival of the Cold War, while the end 
of the Cold War meant that by the 1990s, globalization was being increasingly accepted 
and even embraced worldwide. The overall process of globalization, however, continues 
to be uneven and unfinished. As such, it needs to be emphasized that the benefits of 
globalization have been concentrated in the hands of some people much more than others, 
and in some parts of the world, much more than others,28 which is the case whether 
discussing legitimate transnational corporations or transnational organized crime 
syndicates. Meanwhile, the unintended consequences have also been concentrated and 
have been felt far more by some people than others. In an earlier period, it was generally 
accepted that nation-states in theory and/or in practice were more focused on domestic 
development in an international context. With the rise and spread of mainstream and 
deviant globalization, most states have embraced a new role: that of facilitating 
globalization for the state. This divergence, especially in the developing world, is central 
                                                 
27 This quote is a reference taken from Nils Gilman’s work on modernization theory and deviant 
globalization. Review his talk on deviant globalization at FORA.tv. For more background see, Gilman, 
“Deviant Globalization.”  
28 Ibid. 
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to understanding the failure of supply-side approaches to controlling the trade in illegal 
drugs. As seen in the case of Colombia and elsewhere in Latin America, globalization has 
reinforced uneven economic development and “the hollowing out of the state.”29 This 
chapter examines mainstream and deviant globalization to help provide a framework to 
understand better the unintended consequences of coca eradication in relation to Plan 
Colombia and the War on Drugs. 
A. FINANCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND DEVIANT 
GLOBALIZATION 
The origins of globalization can be found in the changes in international finance 
in the 1970s initiated by the administration of U.S. president Richard M. Nixon (1969–
1974). In 1971, for example, he floated the U.S. dollar and suspended its convertibility to 
gold, and implemented other changes driven by immediate economic and geopolitical 
concerns.30 When combined with the major increase in oil prices in late 1973, they had at 
least four important symptoms that set the stage for the subsequent consolidation of 
mainstream and deviant globalization. First, in the Nixon era, private banks and financial 
institutions (particularly U.S.-based) took on a far more important role in the global 
economy. Second, government supervision of global financial activity was seriously 
weakened, which made money laundering much easier (more on this later). Third, 
financial systems and exchange rates of states around the world were more susceptible to 
changes in US financial markets, particularly those countries in Latin America. Fourth, 
greater competition in national banking systems worldwide was encouraged, while the 
United States assumed a position that allowed it to influence the regulatory regime 
governing financial markets around the world.31 Fundamental technological advances, 
                                                 
29 This quote is a reference taken from Nils Gilman’s work on modernization theory and deviant 
globalization. Review his talk on deviant globalization at FORA.tv. For more background see, Gilman, 
“Deviant Globalization.” 
30 Robert Brenner, “Uneven Development and the Long Downturn: The Advanced Capitalist 
Economies from Boom to Stagnation, 1950–1998,” New Left Review I, no. 229 (1998): 43, 47, 116–24. 
31 Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance (London: 
Verso, 1999), 4–5, 19–26. 
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especially in the area of information technology, aided these financial changes.32 As the 
Cold War ended, these technological affordances were at the core of the arrival of this 
latest wave of globalization. The supply chains of these principle world economic hubs 
became much more integrated and dramatic advances in communication-improved 
factors, such as in-transit visibility replaced stockpile inventory with just-in-time 
inventories that increased the reliability and delivery of goods and information across the 
globe and increasingly bound the major financial centers in North America, Western 
Europe and East Asia, together.  
At the same time, these financial and technological shifts in the world economy 
also established the conditions for a scaling-up of ‘deviant globalization’ by connecting 
those parts of the world on the periphery of globalization to those at its core. The term 
“deviant globalization” is taken from Nils Gilman’s recent edited book, Deviant 
Globalization: Black Market Economy in the 21st Century. It refers to the cross-border 
economic networks that operate “at the intersection of ethical difference and regulatory 
inefficiency.” As they emphasize, “wherever there is a fundamental disagreement about 
what is right” combined with “a connection to the global market” we can be sure that 
“deviant entrepreneurs” will be “there to meet the unfulfilled demand.”33 The concept of 
“deviant globalization” has major implications for the debate about globalization 
generally, but it is also particularly useful for the subject of this thesis. It sheds new light 
on, and helps more effectively frame the cross-border economic networks that demand, 
produce, move, and consume illegal or objectionable goods in the formal global 
economy. Among the wide range of goods and services that thrive in the shadows of the 
legal global economy, illicit narcotics trafficking is amongst the most profitable, and its 
rapid growth and consolidation in some areas of the world has become a major challenge 
to existing structures of governance, wealth, and development. Simply put, deviant 
globalization is inextricably intertwined with mainstream globalization, far more than the 
term ‘deviant’ actually implies; both of which are market-driven activities enabled by the 
                                                 
32 Odd Arne Westad, “The New International History of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 24, no. 4 
(2000): 559. 
33 Nils Gilman, Jesse Goldhammer, and Steven Weber, ed., Deviant Globalization: Black Market 
Economy in the 21st Century (London: Continuum, 2011). 
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same globally integrated financial, communication, and transportation systems. “Both 
break down boundaries—political, economic, cultural, social, and environmental—in a 
dynamic process of creative destruction.”34 Deviant globalization is an unintended 
consequence of globalization and it is not secondary to it; it is central to it.  
The infrastructure of the global economy is unconcerned with social values or 
moral disparities between countries. The trade in illegal narcotics and sex slaves for 
example moves across borders just as readily as automobiles and coffee. Coca eradication 
forced coca cultivation, cocaine production and trafficking to move as well, and as the 
industry grew, it realigned itself as part of a division of labor in which most Latin 
American and Caribbean nations played some role in the production and trafficking value 
chain of cocaine. “As these systems became increasingly efficient, interconnected and 
indispensable, they helped not only the formal global economy to grow, but also its 
conjoined, deviant twin,” shifting the balance of power between non-state actors and the 
state in the process.35 As discussed in more detail in Chapter IV, the market opportunities 
that created deviant globalization were precisely those policies guided by the ethical 
differences between countries. Another of Gilman and his co-editor’s important 
contributions to the vast literature on globalization is their explanation of how it affects 
both the rich (Global North) and the poor (Global South). Perhaps because the Global 
North has understood deviant globalization primarily as a means to meet individual 
demands for things, such as sex and drugs, it has been thought of as a sideline activity 
operating only on the periphery. However, the Global South has a very different 
relationship with deviant globalization. For them, it is a powerful engine of wealth 
creation and a symbol of their exclusion and abjection. On the one hand, participating in 
deviant globalization is often an individual’s fastest ticket out of poverty, and a way for 
entire communities to experience economic development. On the other hand, deviant 
globalization often entails harrowing individual suffering, but it can also provide money 
                                                 
34 Gilman, Goldhammer, and Weber, ed., Deviant Globalization: Black Market Economy in the 21st 
Century, 2. 
35 Ibid., 3. 
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and power to self-dealing government officials, brutal warlords, terrorists, and 
transnational organized crime.36 
The final and most relevant insight afforded by deviant globalization is the 
explanation of how it has altered the political landscape and distribution of power in the 
world economy in ways nearly as profound as any major political-economic trend or 
event has done since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is important to note that until 
recently, the international community has largely neglected to appreciate the impact 
deviant globalization has had on international politics and the economy, and when the 
world’s leadership meets to discuss important issues, such as the global financial crisis, 
global climate change, and poverty for example, deviant globalization is absent from the 
dialogue. However, deviant globalization is inextricably connected to these important 
global issues, and also needs to be highlighted and discussed. As an example of the 
connection between deviant globalization and global climate change, consider the 
unintended deforestation that is a consequence of the wholesale and forced aerial 
eradication of coca plants in Colombia. One of the major contributors to deforestation in 
Colombia and the Andes is the “balloon effect” relating to the relocation of coca 
cultivation. As crops are eradicated in one area, the cocaleros (coca growers), reacting to 
the unrelenting demand from the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, move their coca 
growing operations deeper and deeper into the jungle to grow thousands of additional 
hectares of coca, which is the main component in the making of cocaine. When 
government authorities discover these new coca plots, the entire process repeats itself all 
over again. Many of the social and economic impacts of illicit drug production have been 
studied in great detail but deforestation and environmental degradation is an unintended 
consequence that has received limited attention.  
Most portrayals of globalization concentrate on how information technology, 
financial networks, and logistics have come together to reshape the global economic 
order. However, another important and often overlooked component (deviant 
globalization) has also introduced itself into this already complex system. Deviant 
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entrepreneurs who recognize prohibitions in the mainstream economy as opportunities for 
maximizing wealth perpetuate this multi-trillion dollar “deviant” trade (in goods, such as 
narcotics, sex, money laundering, counterfeit material, oil, and illegally harvested 
timber). As it relates to coca eradication, the U.S. and Colombian governments attempted 
to disrupt the supply chain of coca, and ultimately, of cocaine by eradicating the primary 
ingredient at the source. However, because demand for cocaine as measured 
internationally went largely unchanged, supply chains were altered regularly in reaction 
to government initiatives to continue the flow of cocaine to where it was demanded. The 
primary coca growing countries in the Andes prior to Plan Colombia were Peru and 
Bolivia, and government pressure in those countries forced supply chains to adapt and 
move north. Just as with any business that reacts to obstacles (either regulatory or 
physical) that effect supply chains, drug traffickers respond in similar fashion. Every time 
they moved however, their activities had severe implications (as is discussed later) for the 
communities affected.  
B. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF NEO-LIBERAL REFORM 
The consolidation of globalization (deviant and mainstream) was in part 
facilitated by the debt crisis of the 1980s, which provided the leverage to speed up 
financial deregulation, trade liberalization, and privatization in the Global South, 
particularly in Latin America. The debt crisis and the lost decade followed on from the 
way many of the petroleum-exporting states, especially in the Middle East, acquired 
massive profits in the wake of the dramatic increase in oil prices in the 1970s. These so-
called petro-dollars were deposited in Western European and North American banks. The 
banks in turn endeavored to locate borrowers, turning to states in Africa, Asia, and most 
notably, Latin America. Given the focus of this thesis, it is important to note that by the 
start of the 1980s, more than 60% of the total foreign debt owed to private banks 
worldwide was owed by the governments of Latin America. In 1970, the combined 
foreign debt for all governments in Latin America was USD $2.3 billion. By 1975, the 
figure had grown to USD $75 billion, rising to USD $229 billion by 1980, and USD $340 
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billion by 1983.37  While the legitimate economy slumped during this period, exports of 
illicit goods, cocaine in particular, grew exponentially, and as demand for narcotics 
increased in the United States the coca growing countries (Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia) 
of the Andean region adjusted their supply chain of “cash crops” to meet growing 
demand from the United States.  
Kevin Healy’s work on the agro-industrial side of the cocaine industry traced the 
rise of coca growing in the Andes in part to official policies taken by governments to 
stimulate stagnant highland economies. For example, the Bolivian government attempted 
to increase opportunities for impoverished highland communities by incentivizing their 
relocation to the more productive lands of the Chapare foothills. These relocation and 
agricultural development programs (largely funded by the United States) provided the 
land, and large-scale layoffs (preceded by the privatization of the mining industry) 
provided the labor, and these factors together with strong demand signals for cocaine 
from the United States contributed to a scaling up of the coca industry in the region.38 
This example narrative linking U.S. led neo-liberal reform to the unintended 
consolidation and expansion of coca growing in the Chapare is illuminating, and lends 
itself well to understanding the unintended consequences discussed later in this thesis.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union (1989–1991) was also a major boost to neo-
liberal economic reform and globalization. The changes in the 1980s and the end of the 
Cold War converged with and reinforced support for the Washington Consensus, a term 
coined by John Williamson in 1990. The Washington Consensus encompassed a 
particular set of neo-liberal and pro-growth economic policies seen to be the standard 
economic development package for countries and regions that sought growth and access 
to the global marketplace.39 The privatization of state-run companies in favor of private 
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enterprise, along with liberal trade and investment policies, were the standard 
prescriptions across much of Latin America throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. The 
repercussions of this indirect influence the United States had over Latin America (by way 
of neo-liberal reforms) would turn out to be enormous for the War on Drugs and Plan 
Colombia as local solutions to local problems were quickly dominated by, and replaced, 
with U.S. solutions. On the one hand, the pressure to globalize diminished the 
government’s ability to influence large rural sectors throughout the Andes. On the other, 
globalization provided deviant entrepreneurs with the tools to exploit the lack of 
governance.  
C. THE “HOLLOWING OUT OF THE STATE” AND “TRANSNATIONAL 
ORGANIZED CRIME” 
Globalization, in an uneven but unrelenting fashion, has pushed governments in 
many parts of the world to the limits of their potential as the arbiters for development 
within their borders. Central to the argument being made in this thesis about globalization 
is the “hollowing out of the state.” As global markets expand, the territorial boundaries of 
states become more irrelevant, and national sovereignty is weakened or completely 
undermined.40 The United States is both a major facilitator of this trend and a much 
abused and or idealized model. Consider for example Thomas Friedman’s suggestion that 
“America, at its best” is both “a spiritual value” and a “role model” for the world.41 
However, since the 1980s, the U.S. government has focused more on the redirection of 
government funds away from domestic infrastructure and towards the promotion of neo-
liberal economic reform to increase global market share for U.S.-based corporations.42 
As Jeffrey E. Garten, Dean of the Yale School of Management and former 
Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade in the first Clinton administration 
has argued, U.S. companies “have internationalized” in the past 20 or 30 years “more 
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than is generally acknowledged.” At the beginning of the 21st century, their supply 
networks, production systems, labor forces, management, and financing are increasingly 
globalized. A significant number of Fortune 500 companies now receive over 50% of 
their income from overseas, while “global diversification” continues to be a key goal of 
most of the remaining companies in this group. Although the orientation of the Bush 
administration after September 11 2001 may have shifted (and it should be emphasized 
that what has occurred is a reorientation, or a military deepening of, rather than a retreat 
from, globalization), U.S. companies will continue to “have much more interest in an 
open world economy than in one focused on increasing regulation.”43 
Nevertheless, this dynamic and uneven world economy centered on globalization 
has transformed rather than obviated the role of states. While the rise of globalization has 
hollowed out the state, state intervention continues to be necessary to participate 
successfully in mainstream globalization. For example, the elimination of constraints on 
international financial flows, the privatization of public sectors, and a whole range of 
changes to financial and economic regulation and control, have occurred because of state 
interventions.44 In many cases, however, the new globalizing state is providing the 
framework for illicit actors, especially transnational organized crime for which one major 
source of income is the trade in illegal drugs: Colombia being a key source of cocaine 
and a key focus of the War on Drugs.  
As a result of the shift in power resulting from the “hollowing out” of the state in 
the developing world, new opportunities were created for illicit actors. Despite Thomas 
Friedman’s assertions to the contrary, the world isn’t flat, at least not to the extent he 
describes, and not for everyone equally. What is omitted from his pages is any significant 
mention of the “dark side” of globalization. Certainly, technology, connectivity, and 
collaboration have “flattened” the world and are leveling the playing field of global 
competitiveness.45 However, this process is, as has been emphasized, uneven, unfinished, 
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and it is the deviant entrepreneurs of the international marketplace who routinely exploit 
and have far fewer constraints than legitimate companies and states, and the 
“monetization of borders” is a greater asset for the former than it is for the latter. For 
example, of the USD $65 billion turnover annually of the global market for opiates, only 
5–10% (USD $3–5 billion) is laundered by informal banking systems. The remainder is 
laundered through legal trade activities and the legal banking system.46 This data 
represents only a fraction of the world’s illicit trade. What it suggests is that illicit actors 
leverage the same technology and infrastructure as legitimate global trade, but with a 
greater degree of efficiency. Unlike the legitimate economy in which the beneficiaries are 
(at least in theory) widespread, the beneficiaries of illicit trade are far more concentrated, 
and consequently, international transnational organized crime, and money-laundering 
activities, are significant bases of power and can have significant influence over 
governance, especially at the local and regional levels of developing nations. Activities, 
such as human trafficking and the illicit flow of arms, money, drugs, wildlife and 
counterfeit items, are estimated to amount to USD $1–3 trillion annually or 7–10% of the 
world economy, which is a tenfold increase since 1990. This number has been growing 
seven times faster than legal trade.47 The connection between mainstream and deviant 
globalization and the windfall profits that can be made by “deviant entrepreneurs” is 
readily apparent in the cocaine industry. 
D. THE RISK PREMIUM AND THE WAR ON DRUGS 
The cocaine industry does not simply respond to demand from consumer 
countries as is sometimes argued; it also responds to the operating environment of 
producer, transit, and consumer markets. Similar to legitimate corporations that relocate 
business activities overseas to take advantage of labor or tax policy differentials, illicit 
drug enterprises respond in a similar fashion to the “risk premium” associated with 
producing and bringing the drugs to market. Simply put, the risk premium is the 
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additional compensation or return an investor requires for taking on risk. In the 
investment world, lending money to an established government like the United States, for 
example, carries a very low chance of default. Investments in the private sector are 
perceived as riskier than the government, and therefore, have higher risk premiums. The 
risk premium principle in investing also holds true for the illicit drug trade and is a 
central component affecting every actor in the value chain, from the coca grower, to the 
drug trafficker, and ultimately, affects the valuation mechanisms that determine retail 
prices in the United States. 
Contained within the enormous literature on illicit drug trafficking is the repeated 
reference to the “balloon effect.” According to a UNODC report for example, in 1999, 
prior to Plan Colombia and aerial eradication program, the number of coca producing 
departments in Colombia was twelve. By the end of the most intensive periods of the 
aerial eradication campaign (measured in total hectares sprayed), in 2007, the number of 
coca producing provinces had skyrocketed to thirty-seven.48 Although the “balloon 
effect” is a useful metaphor to understand and describe the shifting patterns of drug 
production and trafficking resulting from state sponsored efforts to eradicate and interdict 
illicit drugs, it falls short of explaining the basic economic principles at work to cause 
growers and traffickers to move to areas with more favorable conditions. The risk 
premium is a useful concept to facilitate this understanding, as well as provide the 
justification for why the coca and cocaine industry has thrived. 
The greatest contributor to the value of illicit narcotics, such as cocaine, is the 
enormous risk associated with producing and bringing the commodity to market. Actively 
enforced prohibition is the basis for the high prices of illicit commodities, such as 
cocaine, and ultimately, responsible for the windfall profits earned by transnational 
organized crime that in turn provides the basis for its power and influence. As the drug 
war escalates, more coca is eradicated, more traffickers are caught, and more cocaine 
seized. However, these law enforcement gains are temporary, and drug traffickers quickly 
adapt to compensate for lost profit. Looking past these short-term gains, the medium to 
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long-term result of law enforcement initiatives is the indirect price support to the industry 
overall, and it is also a catalyst for expansion and re-penetration of the illicit industry into 
others regions in the Andes and elsewhere. State sponsored efforts to eradicate and 
interdict drugs, for example, force risk-averse growers and traffickers to move to areas in 
which the risks are fewer, the costs of doing business are lower, and profits are higher. 
Thus, successful eradication tends to create incentives in precisely the wrong direction 
because temporary production declines drives up farm-gate prices, and thereby, 
encourages replanting and expansion of cultivation, which eventually reverses the 
reductions achieved.49  
As has been demonstrated thus far, globalization has “flattened” the world, and 
created opportunities where few may have existed. Flat does not mean fair, and 
opportunities to profit in legitimate “risk free” businesses are limited for many of the 
residents in the coca growing regions of the Andes. The proliferation of the illicit coca 
and cocaine industry in the region is a testament to this fact, and those regions left out of 
the “globalization white-tie party” (either because of institutional or educational 
limitations, or by choice) have responded to market signals and have pursued an 
“underground rave party” of their own. Before the implementation of the Washington 
Consensus, much of Latin America had poor income distribution and some countries had 
extreme levels of poverty.  Afterwards, the situation remained relatively the same.  The 
difference however, was that it now had the tools to compete.  The important take away 
from this example is that the risk premium is too influential to be discounted or to be 
viewed as a constant. It will fluctuate up and down, dependent on the policy context and 
law enforcement capacity of the originating country, transit locations, and the destination 
market.  
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E. MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE OR MUTUALLY SUPPORTING: 
“TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME” AND THE PROHIBITION 
REGIME 
As described above, the risk premium associated with the illicit narcotics trade is 
dependent on its international prohibition. Additionally, the disparate law enforcement 
capacities of the each of the signatory countries party to the 1988 United Nation’s 
Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
facilitates the flow of narcotics from producer nations mainly in the developing world to 
consumer nations predominantly in developed world. “Organizations” that trafficked in 
narcotics were and in some quarters still are referred to as Drug Trafficking 
Organizations (DTOs). More recently, however, these organizations have increasingly 
become know by the term transnational organized crime.  This point is important because 
it demonstrates a somewhat better understanding of the structural evolution that has 
occurred within and between criminal networks, and clarifies the implication that these 
organizations are not only global, but also highly diversified. However, even 
transnational organized crime, as a term, falls short because these are in fact, not 
organizations in the traditional sense, but rather complex networks operating in a market 
of crime. Accordingly, national law enforcement agencies have with varying degrees of 
success sought to respond to the increasingly global character of the trade in illegal 
narcotics. Writing in 1999, Hans T. van der Veen argued that: 
The drug industry is probably the largest and most profitable sector of 
international crime. The perceived threats of drug consumption and 
organized crime provide the main justifications for important impulses 
given in recent years to the development of legislation and the 
organization of law enforcement. Drug repression thereby increasingly 
acquires an international character. Unilateral, bilateral and multilateral 
forms of pressure, intervention and collaboration are proliferating between 
states in the name of suffocating the ever-swelling drug economy. The 
prohibition regime is thereby, in a rapid pace, extended with the coercive 
powers of states to intervene in national and international drug markets, 
but therewith also in the sovereignty of individuals, peoples and countries. 
Just as individuals might get addicted to the use of drugs, so the societies 
in which they live are becoming addicted to the money that is generated in 
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the drug business. This seems to be equally true for the agencies that are 
assigned the task to control it.50 
Armed with this understanding of the mischaracterization and narrow view of illicit 
networks, along with the state of co-dependency that has developed between the narcotics 
industry and the international prohibition regime, it can be seen how the War on Drugs 
has come to a stalemate. Armed with an understanding of the connection between 
transnational organized crime and the prohibition regime in relation to mainstream 
globalization, the next chapter examines Plan Colombia, which was a major effort to 
stem the flow of illegal narcotics. 
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III. PLAN COLOMBIA AND THE EXPANDING PROHIBITION 
REGIME 
What business do we have destroying and leading to the killing of 




The rise and consolidation of globalization has always required a significant 
amount of inter-state diplomacy, with some level of military underwriting. This 
connection is reflected in successive versions of U.S. National Security Strategy 
documents. More specifically, for example, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta 
asserted earlier this year, that “(a)cross the globe, we will seek to be the security partner 
of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations… whose interests 
and viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and 
prosperity.”52 The close civil-military partnership in relation to globalization does not 
necessarily equate to direct military intervention, but given the post-Cold War expansion 
of the role of the U.S. military into a variety of what were traditionally considered non-
war-fighting functions, U.S. diplomatic and military initiatives have become almost 
inseparable. The U.S. military has been a major participant in the War on Drugs, virtually 
from the outset in the early 1970s, which coincided with the origins and rise of 
globalization. The role of the U.S. military in the War on Drugs was nowhere more 
apparent than in its involvement in Plan Colombia. Also of particular significance is the 
fact that more coca eradication was conducted under the auspices of Plan Colombia than 
anywhere else in the region. 
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Plan Colombia formally began in 2000 and was at its peak up to 2005. As already 
mentioned in the Chapter I, it is the official name of a program that, among other things, 
provided the institutional framework for bolstering the military alliance between the 
United States and Colombia in the war against illegal drug production, trafficking, and 
the organized criminal groups associated with these activities.53 As also observed earlier, 
Plan Colombia was initially conceived as an aid package that would go beyond anti-drug 
production and trafficking, and include the peace process (between the Colombian 
government and the FARC), economic and social development, judicial reform, the 
improvement of human rights, and democracy-promotion. By the time it was 
implemented, however, most of the aid took the form of military equipment (helicopters, 
planes, chemicals to spray the illegal crops, and radar equipment), along with military 
training at the expense of other stated goals including much needed development. 
Ultimately, Plan Colombia can be seen as an effort to bring about a series of structural 
changes in the supply chain of cocaine. This chapter focuses on the effects of the U.S. 
drug control strategy in Colombia and the region, and considers the widening gap that 
exists between the far-reaching objectives of Plan Colombia, and what was actually 
achieved. For the most part, because of the adaptive character of the drug trade, short-
term “successes” have not translated in any meaningful way into long-term achievements, 
such as reduced coca production or a reduction in the quantity of cocaine reaching the 
U.S. market. Instead, the drug trade has quickly sidestepped repeated attempts at 
suppression irrespective of national borders. More than 10 years after intensive 
interdiction and eradication campaigns in Colombia, coca growing and cocaine 
production has simply shifted elsewhere in the Andes. At the same time, shifting 
trafficking patterns have brought violence to regions previously unaffected by the drug 
war. All the while, the cocaine supply has remained steady, a trend that reaches back well 
before Plan Colombia to the formal declaration of the War on Drugs and earlier. 
                                                 
53 Daniel Mejía and Pascual Restrepo, “The War on Illegal Drug Production and Trafficking: An 
Economic Evaluation of Plan Colombia,” Documentos CEDE 2008–19, October 2008, 2, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1485690. 
 31
A. THE WAR ON DRUGS 
The United States was combating drugs even before President Richard Nixon 
coined the term “War on Drugs” in 1971.54 Since then, numerous approaches and funding 
initiatives have attempted to reduce drug trafficking into the U.S. During the early days 
of the War on Drugs, U.S. policy makers viewed it as a social problem that could 
potentially be cured via the treatment and rehabilitation of those using the drug 
concerned. However, the 1970s drug epidemic changed the prevailing view, and shifted 
the emphasis from prevention and treatment to viewing it primarily as a law enforcement 
problem. To this end, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was created in 
1973.55 This new government agency represented a strategic change in direction in 
relation to combating the distribution and use of illicit drugs, and was indicative of the 
new approach to drug enforcement led by a growing and empowered prohibition regime. 
Meanwhile, the rapid growth of the global cocaine industry during this period 
fundamentally transformed U.S.-Latin American relations. Nowhere is this change more 
apparent than in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia; the three countries that formed the “silver 
triangle” of cocaine production in the Andean region. Antinarcotics policy has come to 
dominate the debate in Washington about relations with these three nations, while more 
urgent problems, such as the region’s unmanageable debt, economic disarray, and 
political instability, have been relegated to the sidelines.56 
The dramatic rise in cocaine use by the mid-1980s and the related violence in the 
United States prompted many of the subsequent hard-hitting drug control policies. Three 
years after President Reagan (1981–1988) declared that the War on Drugs was a national 
security imperative, his successor and former vice president, George H. W. Bush (1989–
1993) embarked on the “global war against narco-trafficking.” In his inaugural address, 
                                                 
54 Rachel Neild, “U.S. Police Assistance and Drug Control Policies,” in Drugs and Democracy in 
Latin America: The Impact of US Policy, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 68. 
55 Adam Isacson, “The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs,” in Drugs and Democracy in Latin 
America: The Impact of US Policy, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2005), 19. 
56 Peter Andreas and Coletta Youngers, “U. S. Drug Policy and the Andean Cocaine Industry,” World 
Policy Journal 6, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 529. 
 32
the first President Bush referred to drug trafficking as a “clear and present danger” 
threatening the national security of the United States,57 which was followed by the launch 
of the Andean Initiative that sought to reduce the supply of drugs by curbing drug 
production in and seizing shipments from the so-called source countries. The focus of the 
initiative was to empower military and police forces in the region to conduct counterdrug 
operations backed, of course, by U.S. training and material support.58 This was the 
beginning of a lasting trend for U.S. drug strategy favoring militarization at the expense 
of other stated goals, such as socioeconomic development and the strengthening of 
democratic institutions. 
For four decades, the war on drugs has persisted. From the outset and to the 
present, the major components of U.S. drug control policy have been interdiction, 
especially cocaine shipments, and the eradication of coca crops across much of the coca-
growing regions of the Andes. The principle targets of U.S. eradication campaigns since 
the beginning of the “war on drugs” have been Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. Eradication 
policy is driven by the premise that eliminating coca plants will lead to a decrease in the 
production of cocaine that, gradually reduces the supply in the United States. As cocaine 
becomes scarcer, prices will increase thereby discouraging its use. However, as has been 
emphasized, illicit drug markets have proven exceptionally difficult to control, 
particularly from the supply-side. Despite “successful” eradication programs in Peru and 
Bolivia in the late-1990s, coca cultivation moved north, and Colombia became the largest 
coca growing and cocaine producing country in the world.59  
During this period, a partial shift away from interdiction and a renewed emphasis 
on crop eradication occurred. The reasoning was that interdiction was expensive and 
complicated, required the deployment of U.S. forces, establishment and maintenance of 
overseas bases, operations in international waters, close cooperation with host nation 
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security forces, and a litany of other complexities. On the other hand, eradication was 
perceived as simple because crops are out in the open and “they don’t move.” Under 
President Clinton, eradication became the preferred approach to drug control throughout 
the 1990s.60 In Bolivia and Peru, police and military forces participated in manual 
eradication; literally pulling the coca crops out of the ground by hand. In Colombia, 
however, the situation was more complicated because of escalating violence from armed 
groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National 
Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). As 
these groups were highly dependent on the drug trade to finance their activities, and 
would likely fervently defend their main source of income, it was decided that manual 
eradication was not a viable option. As a result, Colombia became the only country in the 
region to allow aerial spraying of herbicides. Fumigation, as the preferred eradication 
technique, grew rapidly from 5,600 hectares in 1996 to 127,000 hectares in 2003.61 As 
seen in Chapter IV, the increased emphasis on coca eradication, leading up to and during 
Plan Colombia, was to have significant unintended consequences. 
B. MAKING PLAN COLOMBIA 
As mentioned earlier, Colombian President Andres Pastrana proposed the original 
idea of Plan Colombia. As Mario Murillo observed, and is worth quoting at length, the 
earlier language of the plan focused on the needs of the countryside and the profound 
poverty that fueled the conflict: 
Plan Colombia initially was a development strategy for the areas most 
affected by the conflict and most marginalized in terms of basic human 
necessities. Modeled after the post-World War II Marshall Plan that 
rebuilt Europe, it addressed the many conditions behind the drug trade and 
the internal armed conflict, such as economic inequality, lack of 
opportunities for progress, especially for Colombian youth, and an 
unequal distribution of land. It also addressed questions relating to the 
collapse and general lack of institutional legitimacy and the minimal 
capacity to govern on the part of local and national authorities. It raised 
issues such as respect for human rights and the creation of truly 
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participatory democracy as necessary steps in eradicating the fundamental 
seeds of the conflict. Even among traditional critics of Colombian state 
policies, such as members of NGOs, human rights activists, and sectors of 
the different social movements, there was some room for optimism with 
Pastrana’s approach to the problem.62 
The Colombian President’s proposed $7 billion reconstruction program was revised and 
eventually emerged as a commitment from Washington to provide $1.3 billion in aid, 
more than 70% of which would be directed toward military and security measures 
designed to fight the “drug war.”  
U.S. funding for Plan Colombia came out of an earlier program known as the 
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). ACI funding for Plan Colombia from FY2000 
through FY2005 was USD $2.8 billion. If military assistance from the DoD and Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) is included, the total U.S. support to Colombia is USD $4.5 
billion.63 Although some overlap in goals existed between the two countries, the primary 
U.S. objective was to slow the flow of illegal drugs into the United States and promote 
peace and economic development in the region. The original plan also included 
counterinsurgency objectives, but as the Plan Colombia proposal worked its way through 
Capitol Hill, counterinsurgency objectives were dropped over fears of another Vietnam-
like, costly, non-winnable, jungle insurgency.64  
In time, however, Plan Colombia evolved away from its counter-narcotic and 
development roots, and was increasingly reoriented back towards counterinsurgency. 
U.S. assistance totaling nearly USD $4.9 billion between 2000 and 2008 provided the 
Colombian military and National Police with a range of capabilities primarily air 
mobility, which was needed to pursue Plan Colombia’s counter-narcotics and security 
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objectives.65 This shift in resources towards the military and police and a strategy based 
on interdiction and eradication was due in part because of 9/11 and because of the 
escalating violence in Colombia from armed groups, such as FARC, ELN, and AUC. In 
the wake of 9/11, Washington expanded the highly controversial program of aerial 
fumigation of coca plantations in southern Colombia; a policy that had been the focus of 
massive resistance on the part of the peasant coca farmers in previous years.66 
C. RESULTS OF PLAN COLOMBIA 
The results of Plan Colombia can be accessed from three perspectives: the 
reported numeric assessments of key metrics, the U.S. perspective, and the Colombian 
perspective. Plan Colombia’s goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and 
distribution of illegal narcotics by targeting coca cultivation was not met. The general 
finding in terms of reduced coca production appears to have been negligible. Even the 
steep declines in production as a result of eradication in 2002 and 2003 was not translated 
into strategic success; namely, deep and sustainable reductions in the production of coca 
leaf and the availability of cocaine in the U.S.67 Reductions in Colombia’s estimated 
cocaine production have been largely offset by a return of cocaine production to Peru and 
Bolivia, which had actually been the original production hubs prior to the 1970s.68 The 
U.S.-led fumigation program sprayed herbicide on more than 380,000 hectares of coca, 
which was equivalent to 8% of Colombia’s arable land.69 Aerial fumigation of coca 
plantations has continued almost without interruption, despite the fact that human rights 
groups have cited it as a primary cause of the recent displacements of thousands of 
civilians from their homes who are forced to flee into neighboring Ecuador or other 
departments in southern Colombia.70 Despite record highs in the fumigation campaign, 
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the net result was effectively zero as the decline in coca cultivation in one area was met 
with an increase in other regions deeper in the countryside.71  
An additional unintended consequence relating to coca eradication as represented 
by Figure 1, was that the productivity per hectare of coca almost doubled, which 
effectively nullified any reductions overall. Writing for Wired Magazine in 2004, Joshua 
Davis investigated rumors of a new (new at the end of 2004) herbicide resistant strain of 
coca known in the Andes as Boliviana negra. He noted that: 
The herbicide, known by its brand name, Roundup, is the key ingredient in 
the US-financed, billion-dollar aerial coca fumigation campaign that is a 
cornerstone of America’s war on drugs…the farmers of the region may 
have used selective breeding to develop a hardier strain of coca. If a plant 
happened to demonstrate herbicide resistance, it would be more widely 
cultivated, and clippings would be either sold or, in many cases, given 
away or even stolen by other farmers. Such a peer-to-peer network could, 
over time, result in a coca crop that can withstand large-scale aerial 
spraying campaigns. But experts in herbicide resistance suspect that there 
is another, more intriguing possibility: The coca plant may have been 
genetically modified in a lab. The technology is fairly trivial. In 1996, 
Monsanto commercialized its patented Roundup Ready soybean - a 
genetically modified plant impervious to glyphosate. The innovation 
ushered in an era of hyper-efficient soybean production: Farmers were 
able to spray entire fields, killing all the weeds and leaving behind a 
thriving soybean crop. The arrival of Roundup Ready coca would have a 
similar effect - except that in this case, it would be the US doing the weed 
killing for the drug lords. Whether its resistance came from selective 
breeding or genetic modification, the new strain poses a significant 
foreign-policy challenge to the U.S.72  
As far as reducing the supply of cocaine in the United States, Plan Colombia fell far short 
of the 50% reduction benchmark. Based on these metrics, Plan Colombia cannot be 
viewed as a success in that coca cultivation did not fall significantly overall, and the price 
of cocaine remained relatively stable.  
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 Before Plan Colombia After Plan Colombia 
Final price $37,900 $35,862 
Domestic price $1,485 $1,860 
Final supply from 
Colombia 561,000 kgs 474,000 kgs 
Domestic supply 687,500 kgs 645,000 kgs 
Hectares with cocaine 161,700 has 82,000 has 
Productivity per hectare 4.25 kgs/ha/year 7.86 kgs/ha/year 
% of land with cocaine 
crops 32.3% 16.4% 
Seizures by Colombian 
Authorities 87,000 113,000 
% not Seized 87.2% 81.8% 
Colombia expenses 
(assuming a 35% increase) $420 million 566 million 
USA Expenses 0 $465 million 
Supply in consumer 
countries 718,000 kgs 745,000 kgs 
% of US cocaine supplied 
by Colombia 78% 63% 
Figure 1.   Mejia and Restrepo, Summary of the Main Fact About the Cocaine Market 
and the War on Before and After Plan Colombia.73 
In the wake of Plan Colombia, the Alvaro Uribe administration (2002–2010) 
made major economic progress. In 2004, for example, Colombia led Latin America and 
was second overall in the world in improving its investment climate, which helped to 
boost job creation and economic growth. The jobless rate in the country’s 13 largest cities 
dropped to 14.1 percent in October from 14.9 percent in September and 15.4 percent in 
October 2003.74 The improved security condition has also improved the business climate 
in Colombia as more multinational companies are seeking to invest in Colombia, which 
underscores the interdependence between economic development and security. 
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D. THE U.S. SCALE 
The official U.S. rhetoric surrounding Plan Colombia is positive. According to the 
State Department, the success of Plan Colombia is real and measurable, and has helped 
Colombia fight narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and transnational crime; promote 
economic and social development; assist conflict victims; strengthen democratic 
institutions, including human rights mechanisms and the justice system; and begin a 
process to demobilize and reintegrate illegal armed groups.75 Measured in real numbers 
against some of Plan Colombia’s other goals, however, the successes are not as 
convincing. The goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal 
narcotics by 50% in six years was not achieved, which, in part, can be explained by 
neglecting strategies to combat U.S. demand for illicit drugs, measures taken by coca 
farmers to counter U.S. and Colombian eradication efforts, such as moving deeper into 
the jungle, and even simple techniques like covering plants with plastic. 
By 2008, as mentioned earlier, the cost of the military portion of Plan Colombia 
had reached USD $4.9 billion. These funds were provided to the Colombian Military and 
National Police and were used to fund air mobility, helicopters, and other vehicles 
required to allow for the rapid movement of the Colombian counter-narcotics and 
counterinsurgency forces.76 In addition, the United States provided other equipment, 
training, advisors, and intelligence to aid in the professionalization of Colombia’s forces. 
The results included the eradication of hundreds of thousands of hectares of coca, the 
capture or killing of illegal and armed group leaders and combatants, and the seizure of 
tons of cocaine.77  
Additionally, the U.S. provided over USD $1.2 billion to Colombia via the State 
Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and 
Department of Justice for a variety of programs targeting economic, social, and justice 
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programs. The results of these programs included helping displaced persons, and altering 
and reforming the justice system in Colombia. These efforts, however, were relatively 
slow in meeting their goals while other programs and results were difficult to assess.78 
Despite a large portion of non-military aid going to alternative development and job 
creation, the initiatives were not provided in most of the regions in which coca was 
cultivated. Additionally, little analysis was conducted to determine if these programs 
really meshed with their goals of decreasing the production of drugs and achieving 
sustainable results.79 Overall, these programs, in conjunction with the other non-military 
programs, appear to have resulted in modest improvements in some of Colombia’s 
neglected regions and limited reformation of Colombia’s judicial branch.  
E. THE COLOMBIAN SCALE 
The official Colombian government position on the results of Plan Colombia is 
positive. Since 2002, Colombia has experienced an unprecedented period of economic 
expansion, social development, and increased security. Through a series of bold reforms, 
the government has fostered the growth of the Colombian economy, increased 
government transparency, investment in social welfare programs, and a significant 
reduction of the level of violence in the country.80 
The Colombian President, Alvaro Uribe (2002–2010), initiated a policy based on 
a platform of restoring confidence, along three pillars: democratic security, investment 
with social responsibility, and social cohesion based on freedom. Since 2000, U.S. 
assistance enabled the Colombians to achieve significant security advances in two key 
areas. First, the government has expanded its presence throughout the country and has 
displaced illegal armed groups. Second, through its counter-narcotics strategy, military 
and police actions, it has degraded the finances of illegal armed groups and weakened 
their operational capabilities. 
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The security situation has greatly improved by any measure. In 2009, terrorist acts 
were down 84% from 2002, homicides were lower by 45% (lowest homicide rate in 22 
years), and kidnappings dropped significantly, down by 88% from 2002; the lowest rate 
in 22 years.81 Under the policy of restoring confidence, Colombia has reformed its 
judicial and law enforcement institutions, experienced substantial economic growth, and 
provided vital social services. Progress in Colombia is undeniable, and has put the nation 
firmly on the path of peace, justice and security.82  
Another benefit of the drug war has been the modernization of the Colombian 
military and police forces. According to Colombia’s National Planning Department, the 
total military component of Colombian expenses in the War on Drugs under Plan 
Colombia has been about USD $566 million per year since 2000, with the U.S. 
contribution totaling approximately USD $465 million per year in subsidies to the 
military forces of Colombia. Although official estimates for the level of Colombian 
expenses in the war against drug production and trafficking before Plan Colombia are 
unavailable, estimates for military and defense expenditures as a share of GDP do exist. 
Before Plan Colombia, this share was about 3.25% and, after Plan Colombia, had 
increased to about 4.3 percent. In other words, between 1999–2000 and 2005–2006, total 
military and defense expenditures as a share of GDP increased by about 32 percent.83 
Pursuant to the “Leahy Amendment,” U.S. assistance to the Colombian military may only 
be provided to units that have been vetted for human rights abuses as certified by the 
Secretary of State. Since fiscal year 2000, the DOS data indicates that USAID has 
provided over USD $150 million to support the rule of law in Colombia through human 
rights protection, the creation of conflict resolution centers, and training of public 
defenders, among other activities.84  
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Nevertheless, in terms of human rights violations, Plan Colombia continues to be 
a source of contention for civil right’s activists who claim that not enough assistance is 
given to this area. Colombian officials claim that neither the Justice and Peace Unit nor 
the Human Rights Unit has enough investigators and prosecutors to execute their 
missions fully. For example, 45 prosecutors from the Human Rights Unit have to cover 
more than 4,000 assigned cases. From 2002 to 2007, the unit produced less than 400 
convictions, and the lack of support has meant that potentially thousands more crimes 
remain unknown. As of October 2007, over 3,000 known gravesites had not been 
exhumed and less than half of the recovered human remains had been identified.85 
Although the true number will never be known, during the period between 2002 and 
2008, human rights groups estimate that conflict-related civilian deaths totaled 14,000, 
which is separate and apart from the nearly 21,000 soldiers, police, guerillas, and 
paramilitary forces killed in this period.86  
Many Colombians, meanwhile, are convinced that U.S. counter-narcotics efforts 
are simply a pretext for continued U.S. dominance in the region. They believe that what 
the United States ultimately wants is control over Colombia’s natural resources, 
especially its oil fields in the northern regions.87 Given the history of oil exploration in 
Colombia, and the indifference that multinationals and the government have shown 
toward indigenous communities in general, indigenous activists, environmentalists, and 
human rights workers had reason to be concerned about the links between Plan Colombia 
and oil interests, and many Colombian politicians and intellectual are highly suspicious 
of Washington’s intent in the region.88 
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IV. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF COCA ERADICATION 
We are expecting them to produce tons of fruit and vegetables to transport 
on trucks they do not have, on roads that literally do not exist, to sell in 
globalized markets against which they cannot compete. 
-NGO official working on alternative development programs in Colombia 
 
With an understanding of the deviant globalization framework, Chapter III 
examined the rise and scale of the cocaine industry in Colombia, and also provided a 
clear idea of how, in a highly interconnected world economy in which products (licit and 
illicit) move freely, a policy based on coca eradication was/is ill-suited to stem the flow 
of narcotics if demand remains constant. Finally, the previous chapter also elucidated that 
at the official level in Washington and Bogota, Plan Colombia was and continues to be 
viewed as a success despite the evidence to suggest otherwise. The official perspectives 
are both highly politicized and narrowly focused, which is especially worrisome since 
Plan Colombia has been viewed in some quarters as a counternarcotic and development 
model that could be replicated in other Latin American countries, such as Mexico. 
Over the last decade, considerable progress has been made in developing a greater 
understanding of the impact of eradication and rural development in coca growing areas. 
Some of the problems realized stem from improper sequencing of eradication and 
alternative development. According to a UNODC report from an International Workshop 
on Alternative Development, some key findings directly related to crop eradication were 
known well in advance of Plan Colombia and could have served as a warning when 
prospective policies were being considered. For example, a 1998 United Nations Special 
Session of the General Assembly (UNGASS) Action Plan warned, “In areas where 
alternative development programs have not yet created viable alternative income 
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opportunities, the application of forced eradication might endanger the success of 
alternative development programs.”89  
As was emphasized in the previous chapter, more coca eradication occurred 
during and in the immediate wake of Plan Colombia than anywhere else in the world. The 
areas most affected were also the areas of the highest unemployment and least state 
presence, which made alternative development difficult, if not impossible, to implement 
effectively.  
The extent and severity of the unintended consequences of coca eradication in 
Colombia call into question whether or not Plan Colombia can be considered a success. It 
is important to emphasize that one of the primary goals of Plan Colombia was to reduce 
the supply of cocaine flowing into the United States by 50 percent. As noted by UNODC, 
many alternative development projects measure their success in terms of reduction in 
cultivation. This is questionable as an appropriate measure of success because it ignores 
the conditions under which opium poppy and coca are cultivated, and the common 
problem of replanting following eradication.90 As Plan Colombia progressed, and the 
unintended consequences of the eradication policy became increasingly clear, the 
definition of success began to change. When it became apparent that a significant 
reduction in the supply of coca had not occurred, this particular goal was set aside in 
favor of other more flattering less tangible metrics of success, such as reduced corruption 
and judicial reform.91  
The cocaine supply chain, meanwhile, was largely uninterrupted. In fact, by 
eradicating coca, the U.S. and Colombian governments have maintained the risk premium 
that supports everyone up and down the value chain of the cocaine industry including the 
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prohibition regime (military and police). In this increasingly connected world in which 
demand for cocaine has not decreased, the loosely organized but highly adaptable 
network of coca growers, processors, traffickers, and retailers have found ways to nullify 
the multi-billion dollar government initiative to put them out of business. In fact, areas 
that had seen reductions in coca production are now thriving once again, and the market 
for cocaine has expanded to countries within the region, such as Brazil, and also to 
Europe. In addition to issues previously mentioned, the research also identified the 
following unintended consequences relating to coca eradication: political instability, 
social consequences, such as migration and displacement, and environmental and health 
consequences. To help visualize how the aerial fumigation of drug crops in Colombia set 
in motion a vicious circle of human, social and environmental destruction, the following 
model was borrowed from a publication entitled “A Vicious Circle: The Chemical and 





Figure 2.   Martin Jelsma Model for Visualizing the Unintended Consequences of Crop 
Eradication92  
A. UNINTENDED POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES: UNDERMINING THE 
STATE 
The principle divisions that led to ongoing and violent political conflict in 
Colombia have been along class lines, as opposed to ethnic lines. The guerrilla 
insurgency in Colombia, which dated back to the 1960s if not earlier, represented a 
prolonged rural rebellion in a rapidly modernizing and urbanizing society, which over the 
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same period, has become ever more deeply intertwined with the international narcotics 
trade. This overlay of national and transnational organized crime has obscured the 
political dimensions of the conflict, leaving U.S. and Colombian policy makers focused 
on the prevention of narcotics production.93 This dynamic was only made worse by the 
9/11 attacks, and as mentioned previously, placed a military solution at the center of the 
War on Drugs and the conflict with the various insurgency groups in Colombia. 
By appreciating that the FARC has coexisted with rural communities for decades 
and recruits most of its soldiers from the rural areas in which it operates, it is possible to 
begin to understand how the eradication policy ran counter to state legitimacy and 
bolstered the position of insurgency groups relative to the rural populace. In many rural 
areas in which the percentage of the people living below the poverty line was 82% in 
2000, the FARC represented one of the only effective sources of employment and 
opportunity for the populace.94 These poor farmers became so dependent on coca 
growing and cocaine production for their livelihood that they would fight any 
government attempt to eliminate it. Colombia’s dire economic conditions and limited 
reach outside of urban areas not only ensured the FARC a steady stream of recruits, it 
also led to increasing numbers of people migrating to rebel-controlled regions, 
particularly in the east and south in which the rebel group functioned as the de facto 
government providing social services, education, and law and order.95 As the state was 
being “hollowed out” to be more competitive internationally, what was happening is that 
non-state actors were consolidating their power and influence throughout the Colombian 
countryside.  
Up until the early 1990s, Peru and Bolivia were the principle cultivators of coca. 
After U.S. sponsored coca eradication intensified in those countries, Colombian drug 
trafficking operations (which previously purchased coca leaves for processing to coca 
paste) saw an opportunity to monopolize the value chain, and between 1995 and 2000, 
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doubled their coca growing efforts on Colombian soil.96 The combination of U.S.-
sponsored eradication campaigns in Peru and Bolivia, economic hardships related to 
weakened economy, implementation of neoliberal reforms that “hollowed out” the state 
in Colombia, and an increased concentration of land ownership resulting from 
paramilitary groups displacing peasants to frontier regions, worked together to set the 
conditions for coca growing to flourish in Colombia.97 Nazih Richani captured this 
dynamic situation well by describing it as follows: 
Coca and other illicit plantations generated a reverse migration process; 
the unemployed migrated from the cities to areas of colonization. The 
sociopolitical implications of such a process have been multifaceted, 
affecting the social fabric of these areas whereby the relatively stable old 
peasant settlements of twenty or more years mix uneasily with an impetus 
of new migrants seeking the coca rush.98 
Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, coca growing became an important source of 
economic survival for an expanding population of over one million peasants in rural 
Colombia, who in turn, depended upon groups, such as the FARC, for protection.99  
In this way, a symbiotic relationship was established. The FARC provided 
peasants with protection from paramilitary groups, and other benefits such as education 
and infrastructure development that the state did not provide. In return, the peasants 
provided the FARC with tax revenue of between 7% and 10% of the market value of coca 
paste, significant revenues that the FARC used to better train and equip its fighters. The 
deteriorating economic conditions outside of the coca growing regions and the escalating 
dirty war being promulgated by paramilitary groups ensured a steady flow of workers to 
FARC-held regions and allowed the FARC to expand throughout rural Colombia.100 
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Colombia has a long history of internal conflict and strife; for many years non-
state actors competed directly and indirectly against the state, and more recently, the 
military, for power. The situation in the country continued to be bleak as Plan Colombia 
unfolded after 2000. Much of the rural population, either directly engaged in coca 
production or displaced by violence and unrepresented by the state, was already strongly 
aligned or susceptible to insurgent groups and paramilitary organizations that themselves 
represented the interests of wealthy landowners. While Colombia has made some gains in 
the area of security, institutional consolidation has remained relatively fragile, unable to 
investigate fully or rein in the number of human rights violations conducted in particular 
by paramilitary groups. Referred to locally as “parapolitics “ the term refers to the 
situation in which political heavyweights (including high- ranking officials, such as 
Senator Mario Uribe, cousin of President Uribe), many of whom are well connected, hold 
high government positions, or are large landholders with ties to narco-trafficking—
fostered and funded brutal pro-government paramilitary groups. These groups engaged in 
scorched-earth tactics (marked by hundreds of gruesome massacres and mass graves) and 
killed tens of thousands of noncombatants in the 1990s and early 2000s. At their worst, 
they readily surpassed the guerrillas and the armed forces as Colombia’s worst human 
rights violators.101 
Moreover, Colombia’s strong alignment with the U.S. military with its preference 
for widespread fumigation undermined the credibility of the Colombian state,: the 
preoccupation with coca eradication suggested, to many Colombians that the state was 
not serious about development. With the local branch of the state providing few 
alternatives to the stable and profitable income derived from coca growing, local farmers 
have had little or no incentive to consider other means for their livelihood. For example, 
many alternative development programs have been hindered by lack of infrastructure and 
other deficiencies. As one NGO expert put it, “We are expecting them to produce tons of 
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fruit and vegetables to transport on trucks they do not have, on roads that literally do not 
exist, to sell in globalized markets against which they cannot compete.”102  
To compound the problem of government legitimacy in rural areas, promises to 
support farmers financially during their transition to alternative legal crops were not 
honored. In 2001, a group of 62 international NGOs wrote a letter to U.S. Secretary of 
State Colin Powell addressing this concern and informed him that after six months 
following the agreements, residents had received no compensation for halting their 
production of coca.103 Given that traffickers regularly came through with their payments 
to the farmers, and that funds promised by the state were recurrently delayed or “lost” 
altogether, rural communities like those of the Putumayo region were hard pressed to find 
good reasons to abandon coca production in favor of alternative development options.  
Furthermore, the government’s neglect of pressing social issues resulting from 
forced eradication led many Colombians to seek refuge among some of the rebel groups 
targeted by military and police forces. According to a Human Rights Watch report on 
Colombian child soldiers, for example, many children and youth joined guerilla groups 
“simply ...out of hunger.”104  Others who had their farm of food crops wrongly fumigated 
sough reparations under a government compensation program. However, this program 
also failed to meet expectations. Of the 8,570 official complaints received by the 
Colombian government, only 117 complaints were found to be valid. Seeing this program 
as a waste of time because of the inadequate government response, farmers stopped filing 
complaints for compensation. Faced with the possibility of fumigation and with no other 
way to make a living in these remote ungoverned spaces, farmers resumed growing coca. 
The political instability and shifting power structure of the rural areas created many 
hardships for the residents  
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B. UNINTENDED SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES: MIGRATION AND 
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 
Unlike refugees who flee war-torn areas and cross national borders to benefit 
from an internationally recognized system of protection, persons forcibly displaced 
within national borders as a result of armed conflict and regular violations of their human 
rights lack comparable protection. As a result of the armed conflict that engulfed 
Colombia over much of the past four decades, a humanitarian crisis developed which 
places Colombia just behind Sudan in terms of global displacement figures and at the 
head of Latin America’s long list of socio-political emergencies. In the case of Colombia, 
coca eradication has contributed to internal displacement. In fact, while the levels of 
violent conflict and/or coca eradication have declined, internal displacement has at best 
leveled out. Colombia still has roughly four million forcibly displaced persons within its 
borders.105  
In response to the alarming level of internal displacement, the Colombian 
Constitutional Court assumed a central role and had a significant impact on government 
policy and its response to the needs and vulnerabilities of its internally displaced citizens. 
In issuing Decision T-025 in 2004, the court declared that an “unconstitutional state of 
affairs” existed because of the gap between the rights guaranteed to Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) by domestic law, and the insufficient resources and institutional capacity 
of the government to protect these rights.106 Having declared the existence of an 
unconstitutional state of affairs, the court issued a number of complex orders aimed at 
overcoming the problems that gave rise to this situation and protecting the rights of the 
country’s entire displaced population. In addition to establishing minimum mandatory 
levels of protection for IDPs, the National Council for Comprehensive Assistance to the 
Population Displaced by Violence (CNAIP) was granted a two-month period to 
determine the resources required to meet the minimum level of protection as determined 
by law. Upon reviewing this landmark (albeit toothless) judgment in relation to the 
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eradication of illicit crops, the flaws in this decision become readily apparent. As noted 
by Rodolfo Arango, because aerial fumigation in itself is not violent, it is common 
practice to refuse IDP recognition to persons who flee areas of crop fumigation.107 IDPs 
continue to be a serious unintended consequence of coca eradication, and this approach 
regarding IDP status contributes to the delegitimizing of the state, and forces IDPs to 
seek support and protection elsewhere. 
The UN is responsible for outlining the legislative parameters under which the 
eradication of illicit crops is executed. While the 1998 UN Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances excuses the legal cultivation of 
some crops for scientific and medicinal purposes, the convention prohibits all other 
cultivation and states that illicit crops shall be eradicated and removed. However, it also 
mentions that all measures adopted for eradication shall respect fundamental human 
rights. Despite the safeguards outlined by the UN, studies show that crop eradication has 
heightened humanitarian crises, especially in the case of Plan Colombia. This thesis does 
not assert that U.S. sponsored manual and aerial illicit crop eradication is the primary 
cause of IDPs in Colombia. Such a claim would be impossible to prove considering the 
several interrelated and preexisting forces that have come together to encourage 
displacement. Mounting evidence exists, however, that the socioeconomic disruption and 
intensified violence produced by Colombia’s fumigation strategy displaces thousands of 
rural Colombians each year and contributes to the movement of coca growing to new 
areas.108  
Colombia’s nongovernmental Council for Human Rights and Displacement 
estimates that in 2001 and 2002—the two years following Plan Colombia’s inception—
fumigation alone displaced more than 75,000 people nationwide.109 In their 2008 study, 
Michelle Dion and Catherine Russler concluded that aerial eradication contributes to 
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internal displacement through its disruption of both legal and illegal cultivation, and the 
violence associated with military efforts to secure areas for eradication operations. 
Colombia’s eradication strategies clearly intensified displacement in areas targeted for 
fumigation as the state, guerrilla and paramilitary elements struggled for military, 
economic and popular control.110 Their study revealed that displacement disrupts all 
types of agricultural activity and labor markets, and that in sum, aerial eradication has 
had a small and statistically insignificant direct effect on coca cultivation in Colombia. In 
short, they found that the greatest deterrent to coca cultivation is strong state presence, 
and to a lesser extent, fumigation. In fact, their evidence found that elements of 
Colombia’s floating population migrate to coca-producing regions specifically in search 
of the economic opportunities afforded by the illicit drug industry.111 
C. UNINTENDED ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES: AERIAL 
FUMIGATION AND DEFORESTATION 
The debate continues regarding the environmental and human health 
consequences associated with the widespread aerial spraying of herbicides in areas 
known or suspected to be growing illicit drug crops. Of all the drug-producing countries 
in Latin America, Colombia is the only country that has succumbed to U.S. economic and 
political pressure and allowed uninterrupted aerial spraying of coca and opium poppy.  
The active ingredient used in the aerial eradication program in Colombia is 
glyphosate, which is one of the most commonly used agricultural herbicides in the world, 
and a variant of the widely known product called Roundup. It has been tested widely in 
the United States, Colombia, and elsewhere. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) originally approved glyphosate for general use in 1974 and re-registered it in 
1993. The EPA has approved its use on food croplands, forests, residential areas, and 
                                                 
110 Michelle L. Dion and Catherine Russler, “Eradication Efforts, the State, Displacement and 
Poverty: Explaining Coca Cultivation in Colombia during Plan Colombia,” Journal of Latin American 
Studies 40, no. 03 (2008): 404, http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022216X08004380. 
111 Ibid., 404. 
 54
around aquatic areas, and it continues to be one of the top five pesticides, including 
herbicides, used in the United States.112 
Despite the continued approval of its use by the EPA, critics, such as the group of 
scientists led by biochemist Professor Gilles-Eric Seralini, from the University of Caen in 
France, found that human placental cells are sensitive to Roundup at concentrations 
levels far lower than those used in the eradication operation in Colombia. A study of 
farming populations in Ontario demonstrated that exposure to glyphosate, the key 
ingredient in Roundup, nearly doubled the risk of late miscarriages and may help explain 
the high levels of premature births and miscarriages observed among female farmers 
using glyphosate. The study also confirmed that the toxicity effects of glyphosate 
increases in the presence of Roundup ‘adjuvants’ or additives, which renders Roundup 
twice as toxic as its isolated active ingredient, glyphosate.113 
On the other side of the argument are the official positions the Inter-American 
Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) section of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) and the Colombian, U.S., and British governments. Upon official request, 
an in-depth study and assessment of the human health and environmental effects 
regarding the use of glyphosate was conducted and the official results appeared in a 
report entitled “Environmental and Human Health Assessment of the Aerial Spray 
Program for Coca and Poppy Control in Colombia.” The report favored the continued use 
of the substance. Overall, the report concluded that the risks to the environment, humans, 
mammals, most insects, and birds were low. In addition to the findings of Seralini’s 
study, however, the report found that mixing glyphosate with additives such as Cosmo-
Flux produced higher levels of toxicity and had some potential to adversely affect certain 
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species such as amphibians found in shallow bodies of water near spray sites.114 In 
opposition to Seralini’s study, the CICAD study found no connection between 
complications with pregnancy and the glyphosate used in aerial eradication. To be fair, it 
is also important to consider that the total amount glyphosate used in the context of drug 
eradication accounts for less than 15% of the total glyphosate used in Colombia. The 
remaining 85% is used in other non-eradication agricultural uses, which further confirm 
the safety of the substance according to the study. 
Regardless of which reports are the most accurate regarding toxicity levels and its 
effects, the physical damage imposed to the landscape that results from both manual and 
aerial eradication is undeniable. The direct effects of the chemical compounds used in 
aerial spraying may well be negligible as demonstrated in the Figure 3. However, what is 
often overlooked is, that regardless of the means employed (aerial or manual), coca 
eradication results in deforestation. When coca crops are destroyed in one area, cocaleros 
move their operation to a new area and start over: a process that involves clear cutting 
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and burning 5 60 300 97.6 
Planting the 
coca or poppy 1 4 4 1.3 
Fertilizer 
inputs 1 0.5 0.5 0.2 
Pesticide 
Inputs 2 0.5 1 0.3 
Eradication 
spray 1 0.5 0.5 0.2 
Processing and 
refining 2 1 2 0.7 
Figure 3.   Dr. Solomon et al., Potential Environmental Impacts of the Cycle of Coca 
or Poppy Production and the Spray Eradication Program115 
Also of considerable significance is the fact that the substances used by the 
cocaleros to produce the coca paste (the first step of the process that starts with the coca 
leaves, then moves to coca paste, and then to cocaine base, and finally to cocaine itself) 
are far more hazardous to humans and the environment than glyphosate. The dangers of 
these refining agents are exacerbated, as the cocaleros who use them normally do not use 
any kind of protection, and are mostly uninformed about the consequences from 
exposure, or the hazards that the substances pose to the environment. Largely uneducated 
about the proper quantity of fertilizers, and about the dangers associated with these 
chemicals, they routinely dump large quantities of these highly toxic substances without 
regard of the effects. These chemicals include paraquat and endosulfan, both of which 
qualify under the EPA’s highest classification for toxicity (Category I) and are legally 
restricted for sale within Colombia and the United States.116 Meanwhile U.S. government 
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Environmental and Human Health Assessment of the Aerial Spray Program for Coca and Poppy Control in 
Colombia, 90. Of note from the report is the fact that, in the context of the environmental risks from the 
activities associated with the production of coca and poppy, the effects of the glyphosate spray itself are 
small. The major effects are attributed primarily to the uncontrolled and unplanned clearing of pristine 
lands in ecologically important areas for the purposes of planting the crop, and to a lesser extent, the 
chemicals used both as fertilizer for coca, and in the processing of coca paste. 
116 The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR 2005 Volume I), 19. 
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studies conducted in the early 1990s in Bolivia and Peru indicated that producing one 
kilogram of cocaine base required the use of three liters of concentrated sulfuric acid, 10 
kilos of lime, 60 to 80 liters of kerosene, 200 grams of potassium permanganate, and one 
liter of concentrated ammonia. These toxic pesticides, fertilizers, and processing 
chemicals are then dumped into the nearest waterway or on the ground. They saturate the 
soil and contaminate waterways, poison water systems, and affect dependent species in 
the process.117 
The costs of the environmental impact relating to the use of approved herbicides, 
such as glyphosate, must be measured against the potential environmental distress 
resulting from all phases of coca cultivation and refining. For example, in the past two 
decades, coca cultivation in the Andean region has led to the devastation of 
approximately six million acres of rainforest. Continuously displaced by government 
eradication efforts and competition between drug traffickers, the cocaleros move to ever 
more remote areas and routinely engage in the “slash and burn” of forested land to make 
way for their new illegal crops.118 To compound the problem, the devastated land is 
unstable, and regular occurring tropical rains quickly erode the thin layer of topsoil from 
the fields. The practice perpetuates a cycle of soil runoff, depleting soil of nutrients, 
destroying timber and other natural resources that would otherwise be available for more 
sustainable uses, and decreased biological diversity.  
It is not just the cocaleros who contribute to the physical destruction of the forest. 
The drug traffickers also destroy countless acres of jungle forests to construct landing 
strips for their aircrafts and coca processing laboratories. Flaviano Avila, a farmer in 
Guaviare, Colombia, expressed perhaps the most persuasive argument made about the 
environmental harm related to coca eradication. “Until there is investment to change the 
foundation of our economy, people will continue to plant and replant coca, cutting down 




forests and doing what it takes to grow the only product that is easy to bring to market, 
always has a buyer, and generates an income to provide for a family.”119 
                                                 
119 Witness for Peace, Fundacion Minga and Institute for Policy Studies, “An Exercise in Futility: 
Nine Years of Fumigation in Colombia,” 5. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
From its inception, Plan Colombia has been controversial and continues even 
today to stimulate significant debate from academics, political figures, and non-
governmental organizations in the region, from within the United States, and around the 
world. Plan Colombia underwent a transformation from a Colombian vision to a U.S. 
vision that subordinated development strategies in favor of militarization. Lacking the 
array of results promised, and faced with a litany of unintended consequences, 
controversy has accompanied Plan Colombia throughout the duration of its five-year 
execution. The principle argument made repeatedly by critics is that any plan that 
discounts Colombia’s underlying socioeconomic reality, and instead, emphasizes on a 
militarized solution will inevitably fail, regardless of the billion-dollar budget. 
Primary to globalization were the most important global economic 
transformations of the past 40 years; namely, economic deregulation and technological 
advancements. As seen, globalization has reinforced uneven economic development and 
“the hollowing out of the state,” and has in part helped to set the conditions for deviant 
entrepreneurs to exploit the socioeconomic realities present in Colombia and the Andean 
region. U.S. efforts to eradicate coca have neglected the significance of globalization 
(deviant or otherwise). Globalization, and the continuously evolving infrastructure that 
keeps it moving, has enabled deviant entrepreneurs to exploit “hollowed out” states and 
alter in a meaningful way, existing political structures. In the developing world 
especially, deviant entrepreneurs have accrued the power and influence comparable to the 
state.  
Taken from the perspective of the deviant entrepreneur (cocaleros included), 
nothing is deviant about deviant globalization. Due to factors, such as institutional 
weakness, limited state capacity, and substandard educational opportunities, large 
portions of the developing world are in effect ineligible from fully participating in the 
formal global economy. As such, deviant entrepreneurs have replaced the state, and in 
some cases, serve as the sole mediators for prosperity and development.  
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Underwriting the power and influence of these deviant entrepreneurs is the profit 
from illicit narcotics, and the greatest contributor to the value of illicit narcotics, such as 
cocaine, is the huge risk associated with producing and bringing the commodity to 
market. Actively enforced prohibition keeps prices of cocaine high, and ultimately, is 
responsible for the windfall profits earned by transnational organized crime, the basis for 
its power and influence. As some coca is eradicated and some traffickers are caught, the 
medium to long-term result of is indirect price support to the industry overall, and 
movement of the industry into others regions, thereby expanding the problem. Such was 
the case for Colombia that in 1999 prior to Plan Colombia and aerial eradication program 
had 12 coca producing departments. By the end, the number of coca producing provinces 
had skyrocketed to thirty-seven. As the research suggests, efforts to eradicate and 
interdict coca force risk-averse growers and traffickers to move their operations to areas 
in which the risks are fewer and profits are higher. 
Despite the large interdiction and eradication campaigns associated with Plan 
Colombia, the United States has failed to achieve the anticipated reduction in the supply 
of cocaine. As demand for the drug remained relatively constant, the window was left 
open for the “balloon effect,” and the still profitable activities migrated to other regions 
within Colombia, and other countries in the region. The unintended consequences and 
human rights toll paid by the populace have been extraordinarily high, and they continue 
to be a major concern as Colombia continues to have one of the world’s largest 
populations of internally displaced persons. Only time will tell if the security benefits 
realized over the past 10 years will prove sustainable in the long run. It must be said that 
the evidence today suggests that newly constituted forces are slowly emerging whereby 
legitimate state actors are increasing their reach into previously ungoverned spaces. The 
dirty war infrastructure of the paramilitaries is being dismantled with the blessing of its 
top leadership because, as they see it, today “there is a government and there are 
institutions capable of assuming their responsibilities” and in so doing, is putting an end 
to 40 years of internal conflict.120 
                                                 
120 Witness for Peace, Fundacion Minga and Institute for Policy Studies, “An Exercise in Futility: 
Nine Years of Fumigation in Colombia,” 115. 
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The technological revolution that has exploded over the past 20 years has 
supported global economic expansion. It has also supported the expansion and influence 
of transnational criminal organizations and the deviant entrepreneurs who lead them. 
Twenty or so years ago at the early stages of the Internet, the ability to collect 
intelligence, develop situational awareness, and moving forces, material and financing 
quickly around the battlefield while maintaining command and control was a monopoly 
of the state. The reality today however is much different, whereby individuals and small 
organizations (because of technological advances) now have similar capabilities and 
capacity of states. The organization of these groups, unlike those of the state, is highly 
decentralized, and might be best thought of as a highly adaptable network of networks. 
For example, each segment of the value chain in the cocaine trade is independent of the 
other. Where it may take months or even years for the international prohibition regime to 
agree on a plan, and implement a coca eradication campaign, those on the receiving end 
of it can and do, react almost instantaneously. 
Bilateral agreements are insufficient to address this global problem. Future 
endeavors to reduce cocaine production and trafficking must focus on international 
cooperation that also consider demand reduction initiatives in the largest cocaine 
consumer markets (the United States and Europe) and place more emphasis on 
strengthening institutions and alternative development initiatives in the focus country. 
Primary consideration also needs to be given to the objectives of the requesting country 
to achieve a better balance between long-term development goals and short-term security 
goals. For Plan Colombia, the U.S. singular focus on security over social development, 
and the subsequent ‘militarized’ approach, was a significant departure from the intent of 
the Pastrana administration. Perhaps because the United States was the only significant 
donor of aid, the focus shifted both in strategy and implementation predominantly 
towards a U.S. vision of Plan Colombia, and as a result, neither country fully realized 
their goals. By avoiding U.S. unilateralism in future endeavors, and considering global 
perspectives and strategies, then the unintended consequences as experienced in 
Colombia can be more readily curtailed.  For example, consider the 2007 Mexican 
initiative targeting the recent wave of drug-related crime and violence.  The “Mérida 
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Initiative” as it became known, was quickly compared with Plan Colombia, and critics 
were quick to point out flaws in Plan Colombia, such as undermining of national 
sovereignty; insufficient attention to socioeconomic development; failure to reduce drug 
production and trafficking; and inadequate attention to human rights violations especially 
by government forces.  Proponents on the other hand, were quick to emphasize a major 
difference between the two plans, especially the fact that no US military personnel would 
be stationed on Mexico. At least at the level of discourse, it seems that “some policy 
learning has occurred since 2000, and US perceptions of its own responsibilities have 
evolved.”121  On the ground however, the Mérida Initiative appears to have taken an 
equally militarized approach, and may be in danger of repeating some of the mistakes 
made during Plan Colombia. 
Finally, although the focus of future research, an honest legalization debate paired 
with a large-scale demand reduction campaign should also be considered as a means of 
reducing the violence and negative externalities that result from the drug war. The main 
obstacle to starting this sort of candid discussion, however, is countering the 40-plus 
years of consistent support for a policy that briefs well to the American public. To answer 
the question of, how to make politicians admit in public that the war on drugs has been a 
complete failure, Sanho Tree offers a solution.  
The topic of decriminalization or legalization has traditionally been a third rail in 
American politics, in that it may mean political suicide to have a meaningful and candid 
discussion on the topic. Instead, drug policy opinions are shared behind closed doors in 
secret during off-line discussions. As a result, no representative or candidate wants to be 
the first mover on this topic. “Those who have worked on this issue know one of the most 
cynical secrets in Washington: many elected officials (if not an outright majority) are 
willing to acknowledge the fundamental failure of the drug war in private, but continue to 
                                                 
121 Bailey, John. “Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative: Policy Twins or Distant Cousins?” in 
Isidro Morales, ed., National Solutions to Trans-Border Problems?: The Governance of Security and Risk 
in a post-NAFTA North America (Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 149-160. 
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vote in favor of it when the yeas and nays are called.”122 One way to bypass this aversion 
to open dialogue about drug policy as recommended by Sanho Tree, may be to conduct a 
blind Congressional straw poll with nonbinding results. Straw polls are particularly useful 
in that, even though the outcomes are non-binding, they do encourage open discussion 
about sensitive topics because true opinions are often revealed. Straw polls are conducted 
regularly on a wide variety of topics to determine if enough support for an idea exists. 
Making it a blind straw poll and using secret ballots during the vote will maintain 
anonymity. This process will likely reveal actual opinions regarding the current drug 
policy, and can help to determine if alternative policies, such as decriminalization or 
legalization for example, is enough of a mainstream idea to act on it. 
                                                 
122 Comments from Sanho Tree on June 26, 2010 at a political rally heald in Seattle WA. View at 
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